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LIBOR Transition Faqs ‘Big Bang’ CCP Switch Over
RED = Final File Size/Bleed Line BLACK = Page Size/Trim Line MAGENTA = Margin/Safe Art Boundary NOT A PRODUCT OF BARCLAYS RESEARCH LIBOR Transition FAQs ‘Big bang’ CCP switch over 1. When will CCPs switch their rates for discounting 2. €STR Switch Over to new risk-free rates (RFRs)? What is the ‘big bang’ 2a. What are the mechanics for the cash adjustment switch over? exchange? Why is this necessary? As part of global industry efforts around benchmark reform, Each CCP will perform a valuation using EONIA and then run most systemic Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs) are the same valuation by switching to €STR. The switch to €STR expected to switch Price Aligned Interest (PAI) and discounting discounting will lead to a change in the net present value of EUR on all cleared EUR-denominated products to €STR in July 2020, denominated trades across all CCPs. As a result, a mandatory and for USD-denominated derivatives to SOFR in October 2020. cash compensation mechanism will be used by the CCPs to 1a. €STR switch over: weekend of 25/26 July 2020 counter this change in value so that individual participants will experience almost no ‘net’ changes, implemented through a one As the momentum of benchmark interest rate reform continues off payment. This requirement is due to the fact portfolios are in Europe, while EURIBOR has no clear end date, the publishing switching from EONIA to €STR flat (no spread), however there of EONIA will be discontinued from 3 January 2022. Its is a fixed spread between EONIA and €STR (i.e. -
Submission Cover Sheet
SUBMISSION COVER SHEET Registered Entity Identifier Code (optional) LCH Date: March 16, 2012 IMPORTANT : CHECK BOX IF CONFIDENTIAL TREATMENT IS REQUESTED. ORGANIZATION LCH.Clearnet Limited FILING AS A: DCM SEF DCO SDR ECM/SPDC TYPE OF FILING Rules and Rule Amendments Certification under § 40.6 (a) or § 41.24 (a) “Non-Material Agricultural Rule Change” under § 40.4 (b)(5) Notification under § 40.6 (d) Request for Approval under § 40.4 (a) or § 40.5 (a) Advance Notice of SIDCO Rule Change under § 40.10 (a) Products Certification under § 39.5(b), § 40.2 (a), or § 41.23 (a) Swap Class Certification under § 40.2 (d) Request for Approval under § 40.3 (a) Novel Derivative Product Notification under § 40.12 (a) RULE NUMBERS Amended General Regulations, Schedule to the SwapClear Regulations, Part B and Schedule A, Part B to the FCM Regulations DESCRIPTION Introduction of the extension of the eligible maturity of Japanese yen interest rate swaps from 30 years to 40 years. Additionally, the introduction of the extension of the eligible maturity of Overnight Index Swaps from denominated in USD, EUR and GBP to 30 years. There are consequential amendments to General Regulations, Schedule to the SwapClear Regulations, Part B and Schedule A, Part B to the FCM Regulations. LCH.Clearnet Rule Submission SUBMISSION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE CLEARINGHOUSE RULES TO THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION SUBMITTED BY LCH.Clearnet Limited an English limited company FILING AS A REGISTERED DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATION Pursuant to Commission Regulation § 40.6 -
Bulletin 260, June 2020
260 Year XXVI • June 2020 BULLETIN 260 PUBLISHER Croatian National Bank Publications Department Trg hrvatskih velikana 3, 10000 Zagreb Phone: +385 1 45 64 555 Contact phone: +385 1 45 65 006 Fax: +385 1 45 64 687 www.hnb.hr Release dates are disseminated on the advance release calendar posted for Croatia on the IMF’s DSBB (http://dsbb.imf.org). Those using data from this publication are requested to cite the source. ISSN 1334-0050 (online) BULLETIN 260 Zagreb, June 2020 General information on Croatia Economic indicators 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Area (square km) 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 56,594 Population (million)a 4.303 4.290 4.280 4.268 4.256 4.238 4.204 4.174 4.125 4.089 4.067 GDP (million HRK, current prices)b 330,771 328,824 333,215 330,509 331,209 331,343 339,696 351,169 366,426 382,965 400,102 GDP (million EUR, current prices) 45,067 45,130 44,822 43,966 43,732 43,426 44,640 46,640 49,118 51,654 53,969 GDP per capita (in EUR) 10,474 10,520 10,472 10,301 10,275 10,247 10,619 11,174 11,907 12,632 13,270 GDP – real year-on-year rate of growth –7.4 –1.5 –0.3 –2.2 –0.5 –0.1 2.4 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.9 (in %) Average year-on-year CPI inflation rate 2.4 1.1 2.3 3.4 2.2 –0.2 –0.5 –1.1 1.1 1.5 0.8 Current account balance (million EUR)c –2,959 –974 –799 –789 –461 111 1,452 994 1,679 982 1,571 Current account balance (as % of GDP) –6.6 –2.2 –1.8 –1.8 –1.1 0.3 3.3 2.1 3.4 1.9 2.9 Exports of goods and services 32.7 36.2 38.9 39.6 40.5 43.3 46.4 47.7 50.1 50.5 52.1 (as % of GDP) -
Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and Reliable Index of Interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial Discussion Paper
Replacing the LIBOR with a Transparent and Reliable Index of Interbank Borrowing: Comments on the Wheatley Review of LIBOR Initial Discussion Paper 6 September 2012 * Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and David S. Evans *Abrantes-Metz is Adjunct Associate Professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University and a Principal of Global Economics Group; Evans is Executive Director of the Jevons Institute for Competition Law and Economics and Visiting Professor at the University College London, Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, and Chairman, Global Economics Group. The authors thank John H. Cochrane, Albert D. Metz, Richard Schmalensee, and Brian Smith for helpful insights. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to affiliated institutions or their clients. 1 I. Summary 1. The Wheatley Review released its Initial Discussion Paper (the “Discussion Paper”) on August 10, 2012 and has sought comments on its preliminary findings and recommendations on how to reform the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”).1 2. This submission presents an alternative to the LIBOR that would in our view: a. Eliminate or significantly reduce the severe defects in the LIBOR which lead the Discussion Paper to conclude that continuing with the current system is “not a viable option;”2 b. Provide a transparent and reliable measure of interbank lending rates during normal times as well as financial crises; c. Minimize disruptions to the market; and, d. Provide parties relying on the LIBOR with a standard that would maintain continuity with the LIBOR. 3. This alternative, which we call the “Committed” LIBOR (CLIBOR), would: a. -
Commissione Tecnica Per La Spesa Pubblica Elenco Dei
Ministero del Tesoro COMMISSIONE TECNICA PER LA SPESA PUBBLICA ELENCO DEI DESTINATARI DELLE DELLA CeTeS.P. Numero 4 Febbraio ·1989 ·~Q..H~ )C;iqo CR 9/1989 Roma,lS/02/89. l PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO E MINISTRI On.le Giulio ANDREOTTI Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri Palazzo Chigi 00187 - R O M A On.le Gianni DE MICHELIS Ministro degli Affari Esteri Piazzale della Farnesina, l 00194 - R O M A On.le Antonio GAVA Ministro dell'Interno Palazzo Viminale 00184 - R O M A On.le Giuliano VASSALLI Ministro di Grazia e Giustizia Via Arenula 00186 - R O M A On.le Dott. Guido CARLI Ministro del Tesoro Via XX Settembre 97 S E D E On.le Prof. Paolo CIRINO POMICINO Ministro del Bilancio e della Programmazione Economica Via XX Settembre 97 S E D E On.le Rino FORMICA Ministro delle Finanze Viale Boston 00144 - R O M A On.le Virginio MARTINAZZOLI Ministro della Difesa Via XX Settembre 8 00187 - R O M A On.le Gerardo BIANCO Ministro della Pubblica Istruzione Viale Trastevere 76/A 00153 - R O M A Sen. Giovanni PRANDINI Ministro dei Lavori pubblici P.le Porta Pia 00198 - R O M A Prof. Vito SACCOMANDI Ministro dell'Agricoltura e Foreste Via XX Settembre 20 00187 - R O M A On.le Carlo BERNINI Ministro dei Trasporti Piazza della Croce Rossa 00161 - R O M A On.le Oscar MAMMI' Ministro delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni Viale America 00144 ROM A On.le Adolfo BATTAGLIA Ministro dell' Industria, Commercio ed Artigianato Viale Molise, 2 00187 - R O M A Sen. -
EONIA Benchmark Statement
European Money Markets Institute EONIA Benchmark Statement Document Information Document Title: EONIA Benchmark Statement Status: FINAL Business Area: Benchmarks Governance Date: 18th December 2019 EMMI Reference No. D00429A-2019 Sensitivity: Public Document EONIA Benchmark Statement v.1 1 European Money Markets Institute Table of Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 3 2. GENERAL INFORMATION .................................................................................................................. 4 3. MARKET OR ECONOMIC REALITY ..................................................................................................... 5 4. INPUT DATA AND METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 6 5. EXERCISE OF JUDGEMENT OR DISCRETION BY THE ADMINISTRATOR OR CONTRIBUTORS ............. 8 6. CESSATION AND CHANGE OF THE METHODOLOGY ......................................................................... 9 7. POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS OF THE BENCHMARK .............................................................................11 8. SPECIFIC DISCLOSURES FOR INTEREST RATE AND CRITICAL BENCHMARKS ...................................13 ANNEX 1: KEY TERMS .........................................................................................................................15 ANNEX 2: REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................17 -
2021: a Defining Moment for the Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London
21 September 2020 ESMA80-187-627 2021: A Defining Moment for The Interest Rates Reform City Week 2020 – London Steven Maijoor Chair European Securities and Markets Authority Introduction Good morning Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure to participate today in the City Week 2020 forum. The interest rates reform is one of the key challenges that the global financial system is currently facing. Therefore, I would like to thank City & Financial Global and the other institutions involved in the organisation of this forum for inviting me and for including in the agenda a panel discussion on this very important matter. Today, before participating in the panel discussion, I would like to speak about recent and expected developments of the global interest rates reform and the crucial role that the cooperation between public authorities and the financial industry is playing in this process. €STR: the new risk-free rate for the euro area As Chair of a European Authority, please allow me to start with an overview of interest rates transition in the euro area and the challenges that lie ahead of us. ESMA • 201-203 rue de Bercy • CS 80910 • 75589 Paris Cedex 12 • France • Tel. +33 (0) 1 58 36 43 21 • www.esma.europa.eu We are soon approaching the first-year anniversary of the Euro Short-Term Rate, or €STR1, which has been published by the ECB since 2nd October 2019. This rate is arguably the core element of the interest rate reform in the euro area, and I will try to explain why this is the case. -
Una De Divìsa Rinvia La Resa Dei Conti Forlani: Il Cambiamento È Il Diavolo
SABATO 8 AGOST01992 POLITICA INTERNA PAGINA 3 L'UNITÀ La crisi Confusione e scontri al Cn democristiano che rimanda a settembre la partita sui nuovi dirigenti. Il segretario all'attacco: nella De «Mi avete chiesto di restare, ora che volete da me?» De Mita: «Arnaldo, la fiducia devi meritartela giorno per giorno» Una De divìsa rinvia la resa dei conti Forlani: il cambiamento è il diavolo. Martìnazzoli si candida «Il cambiamento per il cambiamento è come il dia vanno a scrivere il documento frettolosa «fa i gattini ciechi». E perdile: sarebbero i Pomicino, ne» per impedire che la legisla essere più esplicito l'eterno IL PUNTO volo». Un Forlani teso e irritato ha chiuso con un finale. Forlani resta alla presi soprattutto il «cambiamento i Mannino, gli Scotti, quelli più tura franasse subito dopo il 6 «candidato del rinnovamento». denza, in piedi e in maniche di per il cambiamento porta a co rinnovatori di me? Vuol tirare aprile. Ma non basta. Se Forla Preferisce il gesto sofferto di ENZO nuovo richiamo all'ordine il Consiglio nazionale camicia, lo sguardo un po' as se sbagliale: il cambiamento è dritto per la strada che si è as ni esorta la De ad «essere» più Trentin ai «sogni» di Occhietto e ROOOI della De. Ha incassato un «si» alla formazione del sente. Sorride solo rivolgendo la caratteristica del diavolo». segnato il non più mite Arnal che «apparire», condizionata all'«algebra dei trasversalismi», governo Amato, ma tutti i «nodi» politici e la sua si al condizionatori d'aria sul Anche il fascismo è stato un do, e chiude con lo stesso ri dal gioco superficiale dei me ma la De - conclude - deve di stessa legittimazione sono rimandati a settembre. -
The Persistence of Corruption in Italy
The Persistence of Corruption in Italy: Politicians and the Judiciary since Mani Pulite Raffaele Asquer Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles Paper prepared for the WPSA 2013 ANNUAL MEETING March 28th, 2013 PRELIMINARY DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE 1 Abstract Starting in 1992, the Mani Pulite (“Clean Hands”) anti-corruption campaign promised to eradicate corruption from Italian political life. For a brief, yet intense period, the public rallied behind the prosecutors, and punished the allegedly corrupt politicians and parties at the polls. However, twenty years later, Italy is still ranked as highly corrupt by Western standards. Why, then, did the Mani Pulite campaign fail to have a long-lasting effect? Relying on original data on the anti-corruption investigations in Milan, as well as on a variety of datasources from the existing literature, this paper argues, first, that the investigations left essentially untouched entire parts of the country where corruption was widespread. Overall, the Mani Pulite campaign had limited deterring effects because judicial inquiries were obstructed by the statute of limitations, and even in case of conviction the sentences were generally mild. Second, the paper finds that the structures of corruption networks have changed since the Mani Pulite season, becoming less vulnerable to further judicial inquiries. There now seem to be multiple sites for corrupt transactions, somewhat dispersed throughout the political system, whereas in the past such activities were centrally managed by a cartel of parties. We reach this conclusion by combining evidence from the literature with original data on two subnational legislatures, the Regional Council of Campania (1992-94) and the Regional Council of Lombardy (2010-12) in which political malfeasance in general seemed widespread. -
Il Sindaco Rosso
Università degli studi di Napoli In una città afflitta da grandi sofferenze, cui si aggiungeranno terremoto “L’Orientale” e terrorismo, ma animata da una forte partecipazione politica, dall’impe- gno sociale degli intellettuali e dalla presenza di una classe operaia sto- rica, l’amministrazione comunale di Napoli guidata da Maurizio Valenzi svolge un ruolo centrale, riuscendo se non altro a tenere viva e a promuo- vere una visione della città e una speranza verso il futuro. IL SINDACO ROSSO Ermanno Corsi in questo volume realizza una ricostruzione per la prima volta puntuale e dettagliata di tutto quanto è avvenuto “prima, durante Valenzi e il futuro di Napoli e dopo” quegli anni (1975-1983). Eleonora Puntillo arricchisce la rico- struzione con ricordi concreti e testimonianze personali. Giustino Fa- brizio avvia spunti interpretativi e anche riferimenti alla realtà attuale. Scritti di: Ermanno Corsi, Giustino Fabrizio, Eleonora Puntillo IL SINDACO ROSSO ISBN 978-88-6719-188-8 SVOLTA STORICA A PALAZZO SAN GIACOMO 1 2 ERMANNO CORSI In copertina: - Comizio in piazza del Plebiscito di Valenzi e Berlinguer, 1976 - Maurizio Valenzi, Sala dei Baroni, penna su carta, 1978 © Ermanno Corsi, Giustino Fabrizio, Eleonora Puntillo Università degli studi di Napoli "L’Orientale" ISBN 978-88-6719-188-8 SVOLTA STORICA A PALAZZO SAN GIACOMO 3 Università degli studi di Napoli “L’Orientale” IL SINDACO ROSSO Valenzi e il futuro di Napoli Scritti di: Ermanno Corsi, Giustino Fabrizio, Eleonora Puntillo SVOLTA STORICA A PALAZZO SAN GIACOMO 5 Indice Prefazione Elda Morlicchio Rettrice dell’Università degli studi di Napoli "L’Orientale" 7 Premessa Lucia Valenzi 9 Ermanno Corsi Svolta storica a Palazzo San Giacomo 15 Eleonora Puntillo Ci divertimmo insieme 95 Giustino Fabrizio Le mani nella città 115 Indice dei nomi 141 6 ERMANNO CORSI SVOLTA STORICA A PALAZZO SAN GIACOMO 7 Prefazione L’Università di Napoli “L’Orientale” ha una tradizione di in- teressi di ricerca rivolti prevalentemente a quanto avviene al di fuori dei confini del nostro Paese. -
Cinemien Film & Video Distribution En ABC Distribution Het Spectaculaire Leven Van Giulio Andreotti
Cinemien Film & Video Distribution en ABC Distribution presenteren Het spectaculaire leven van Giulio Andreotti Release: 14 januari 2008 IL DIVO - synopsis In Rome, bij het ochtendgloren, wanneer heel de wereld nog slaapt, is er een man wakker. Die man heet Giulio Andreotti. Hij is wakker omdat hij moet werken, boeken schrijven, een mondain leven leiden en, in laatste instantie, moet bidden. Andreotti, kalm, achterbaks, ondoorgrondelijk, is al vier decennia aan de macht in Italië. In het begin van de jaren negentig stevent hij onverbiddelijk, zonder arrogantie en zonder nederigheid, roerloos en fluisterend, af op zijn 7e ambtstermijn als Eerste Minister. Andreotti, geboren in 1919, is een gerontocraat die, naar het voorbeeld van God, niemand vreest en de betekenis van onderdanige vrees niet kent. Hij is het gewend om deze vrees terug te zien op het gezicht van zijn gesprekspartners. Zijn voldoening is koud. Macht is zijn voldoening. De macht, zoals hij die graag heeft, vastgeroest en onveranderlijk voor altijd. Hij komt overal zonder kleerscheuren vanaf: verkiezingsuitslagen, terroristische aanslagen, beledigingen en beschuldigingen. Hij blijft er ongevoelig voor en verandert er niet onder. Totdat de grootste tegenstander van het land, de maffia, besluit om hem de oorlog te verklaren. Dan verandert alles. Misschien zelfs voor de roestvaste, ondoorgrondelijke Andreotti. Maar de vraag is of alles wel werkelijk verandert, of is het maar schijn? Een ding is zeker: het is moeilijk om Andreotti te raken, de mens die beter dan wie dan ook weet hoe de wereld in elkaar zit... Il Divo Italië– 2008 – Kleur - 35 mm - Scope - Dolby SRD Duur: 100min IL DIVO - cast Toni Servillo ............................................................... -
Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks: Progress Report
Reforming major interest rate benchmarks Progress report 14 November 2018 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies in order to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. Its mandate is set out in the FSB Charter, which governs the policymaking and related activities of the FSB. These activities, including any decisions reached in their context, shall not be binding or give rise to any legal rights or obligations under the FSB’s Articles of Association. Contacting the Financial Stability Board Sign up for e-mail alerts: www.fsb.org/emailalert Follow the FSB on Twitter: @FinStbBoard E-mail the FSB at: fsb@fsb.org Copyright © 2018 Financial Stability Board. Please refer to: http://www.fsb.org/terms_conditions/ ii Contents Page Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................. iv Executive Summary ................................................................................................................. 1 1. International coordination and key cross-jurisdictional themes ........................... 3 1.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 3 1.2 Issues related to divergence between IBORs ............................................................... 4 1.3 Approach to