Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Situation Matrix
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Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’S Faryab Province Geert Gompelman ©2010 Feinstein International Center
JANUARY 2011 Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan’s Faryab Province Geert Gompelman ©2010 Feinstein International Center. All Rights Reserved. Fair use of this copyrighted material includes its use for non-commercial educational purposes, such as teaching, scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news reporting. Unless otherwise noted, those who wish to reproduce text and image files from this publication for such uses may do so without the Feinstein International Center’s express permission. However, all commercial use of this material and/or reproduction that alters its meaning or intent, without the express permission of the Feinstein International Center, is prohibited. Feinstein International Center Tufts University 200 Boston Ave., Suite 4800 Medford, MA 02155 USA tel: +1 617.627.3423 fax: +1 617.627.3428 fic.tufts.edu Author Geert Gompelman (MSc.) is a graduate in Development Studies from the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (CIDIN) at Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands). He has worked as a development practitioner and research consultant in Afghanistan since 2007. Acknowledgements The author wishes to thank his research colleagues Ahmad Hakeem (“Shajay”) and Kanishka Haya for their assistance and insights as well as companionship in the field. Gratitude is also due to Antonio Giustozzi, Arne Strand, Petter Bauck, and Hans Dieset for their substantive comments and suggestions on a draft version. The author is indebted to Mervyn Patterson for his significant contribution to the historical and background sections. Thanks go to Joyce Maxwell for her editorial guidance and for helping to clarify unclear passages and to Bridget Snow for her efficient and patient work on the production of the final document. -
Badghis Province
AFGHANISTAN Badghis Province District Atlas April 2014 Disclaimers: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. http://afg.humanitarianresponse.info ocha.imu.afg@gmail.com AFGHANISTAN: Badghis Province Reference Map 63°0'0"E 63°30'0"E 64°0'0"E 64°30'0"E 65°0'0"E Legend ^! Capital Shirintagab !! Provincial Center District ! District Center Khwajasabzposh Administrative Boundaries TURKMENISTAN ! International Khwajasabzposh Province Takhta Almar District 36°0'0"N 36°0'0"N Bazar District Distirict Maymana Transportation p !! ! Primary Road Pashtunkot Secondary Road ! Ghormach Almar o Airport District p Airfield River/Stream ! Ghormach Qaysar River/Lake ! Qaysar District Pashtunkot District ! Balamurghab Garziwan District Bala 35°30'0"N 35°30'0"N Murghab District Kohestan ! Fa r y ab Kohestan Date Printed: 30 March 2014 08:40 AM Province District Data Source(s): AGCHO, CSO, AIMS, MISTI Schools - Ministry of Education ° Health Facilities - Ministry of Health Muqur Charsadra Badghis District District Projection/Datum: Geographic/WGS-84 Province Abkamari 0 20 40Kms ! ! ! Jawand Muqur Disclaimers: Ab Kamari Jawand The designations employed and the presentation of material !! District p 35°0'0"N 35°0'0"N Qala-e-Naw District on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, Qala-i-Naw Qadis city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation District District of its frontiers or boundaries. -
Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement—Monthly Update
CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT—MONTHLY UPDATE UNHCR AFGHANISTAN DECEMBER 2012 HIGHLIGHTS IDPs (Internally Displaced Total Increase Decrease Overall change Total displaced as at Total recorded Persons) are persons or 30 November 2012 December 2012 December 2012 December 2012 31 December 2012 in 2012 groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or 481,877 4,450 29 4,421 486,298 203,457 places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to, avoid the effects • IDPs overall: As at 31 December, 486,298 persons (76,335 families) are internally dis- of armed conflict, situations placed due to conflict in Afghanistan. of generalized violence, • violations of human rights or December 2012 : 4,450 individuals (830 families) have been newly recorded as displaced natural or human-made due to conflict of whom 180 individuals (4%) were displaced in December, while 587 indi- disasters, and who have not viduals (13%) were displaced in November and 341 individuals (8%) were displaced in crossed an internationally recognized State border ( UN October 2012. The remaining 3,342 individuals (75%) were displaced prior to October Secretary General, Guiding 2012. Principles on Internal Dis- • Overall in 2012 : Since January 2012, a total of 203,457 conflict-induced IDPs have been placement, E/CN.4/1998/53/ Add.2, 11 February 1998). recorded in Afghanistan. This figure includes 94,299 conflict-induced IDPs (46%) who were displaced in 2012 whereas 109,158 (54%) individuals were displaced prior to 2012. DISPLACEMENT TRENDS BY REGION No new displacement was recorded in the South and Central regions as well as Region end-Nov 2012 Increase Decrease end-Dec 2012 in the Central Highlands. -
Afghanistan: Extremism & Terrorism
Afghanistan: Extremism & Terrorism On September 7, 2021, the Taliban officially announced the appointments within its caretaker government. At the helm of the movement is Haibatullah Akhundzada, who will serve as supreme leader. Mullah Muhammad Hassan was named the acting prime minister, with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi named deputy prime ministers. The top security post was given to Sirajuddin Haqqani, who will serve as acting minister of the interior, a role in which he will have extensive authority over policing and legal matters. Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob, who is the oldest son of Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Omar, is named the acting defense minister. The government is exclusively male, with many positions filled with veterans from their hardline movement in the early nineties. (Sources: New York Times, Associated Press) The appointments came a month after the Taliban began its offensive against major Afghan cities on August 6, 2021. By August 16, the Taliban laid siege to the presidential palace and took complete control of Kabul, declaring the war in Afghanistan had ended. The last U.S. troops flew out of Kabul on August 30, ending a 20-year war that took the lives of 2,500 American troops and 240,000 Afghans and cost about $2 trillion. By the evening of August 30, 123,000 people were evacuated from Kabul. Before departing, U.S. troops destroyed more than 70 aircraft, dozens of armored vehicles, and disabled air defenses that were used to counteract jihadist attacks in the country. The final withdrawal of U.S. troops was not a celebration of a more secure Afghanistan, but marked the beginning of a new Taliban regime. -
World Bank Document
AFGHANISTAN EDUCATION QUALITY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM-II Public Disclosure Authorized MINISTRY OF EDUCATION PROCUREMENT PLAN FY2008-10-11 Public Disclosure Authorized Procurement Management Unit Education Quality Imrpovement Program-II Revised Procurement Plan EQUIP II (Revision Ref.: 04 on 15-05-10) General Public Disclosure Authorized 1 Project information: Education Quality Improvement Project II (EQUIP II) Country: Afghanistan Borrower: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Project Name: Education Quality Improvement Project II (EQUIP II) Grant No.: H 354 –AF Project ID : P106259 P106259 Project Implementing Agency: Ministry of Education of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2 Bank’s approval date of the procurement Plan : 17 Nov.2007 (Original:) 3 Period covered by this procurement plan: One year Procurement for the proposed project would be carried out in accordance with the World Bank’s “Guidelines: Procurement Under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits” dated May 2004; and “Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers” dated May 2004, and the provisions stipulated in the Legal Agreement. The procurement will be done through competitive bidding using the Bank’s Standard Bidding Documents (SBD). The general description of various items under different expenditure category are described. For each contract to Public Disclosure Authorized be financed by the Loan/Credit, the different procurement methods or consultant selection methods, estimated costs, prior review requirements, and time frame are agreed between the Recipient and the Bank project team in the Procurement Plan. The Procurement Plan will be updated at least annually or as required to reflect the actual project implementation needs and improvements in institutional capacity. II. Goods and Works and consulting services. -
Voters Disenfranchised in Faryab
Afghanistan Elections Conundrum (17): Voters disenfranchised in Faryab Author : Ali Yawar Adili Published: 12 October 2018 Downloaded: 12 October 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-admin/post.php Almost two-thirds of voters in Faryab will not be able to vote in the 20 October parliamentary elections after insecurity prevented them from registering. Since voter registration ended in early July, the government has seen an even further loss of control and more than a dozen additional polling centres have since closed. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili recently visited Faryab and (with input from Kate Clark) wonders how inclusive an election is possible in a province now largely controlled or threatened by the Taleban. He also reports concerns that because of insecurity in this Uzbek-majority province, they will have a much smaller ‘vote bank’ and less clout in next year’s presidential elections. (A breakdown showing Faryab’s polling centres and registered voters can be read in an annex.) AAN has put together a dossier of dispatches related to the coming elections, looking at preparations and political manoeuvring. Each dispatch in the Election Conundrum series will be added to it. Maimana city is in the full flow of election campaigning, with 62 candidates competing for nine seats (with three reserved for women) in Faryab province. The city is papered with campaign posters and it is easy to come across candidates talking to voters. There is a concentration of activity in Maimana because it is one of the few places where candidates are able to campaign. 1 / 11 One indication of how much the city is surrounded was the advice given to the author when he wanted to drive to the suburb of Imam Sahib, just twenty minutes from the centre: “Don’t go. -
Afghanistan National Livestock Census 2003
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL LIVESTOCK CENSUS 2003 INTERIM REPORT OSRO/AFG/212/ITA AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL LIVESTOCK CENSUS 2003 INTERIM REPORT FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Contents Acknowledgements iii Executive summary iv Background v ACTIVITIES 1 ■ Organization and planning 1 ■ Recruitment and training 2 ■ Data collection 2 ■ Data entry and checking 3 ■ Data analysis 3 ■ Results 4 ■ Districts 4 VILLAGES, COMMUNITIES AND FAMILIES 6 LIVESTOCK NUMBERS 8 HERD STRUCTURES 14 ■ Female cattle older than two years 14 ■ Young stock 16 ■ Cattle 16 ■ Smallstock 16 ■ Draft animals 18 CHANGES IN NUMBER OF FAMILIES OWNING LIVESTOCK 20 DISCUSSION 22 APPENDICES 1. Explanation of district comparisons between the official list (Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior), 2003, AIMS 2001 and the FAO Livestock Census field data, 2003 2. Total livestock on a district basis 3. Adult cows on a district basis 4. Young stock on a district basis Acknowledgements This work was only possible thanks to the help of many diverse groups including the Government of Italy through the Italian Cooperation Fund, the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry (MAAH), the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MoI), the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in Kabul, the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan, Oxfam (UK) and the University of Kabul. Assistance and cooperation was gratefully received from many staff in the MAAH including Mr Jawat, Deputy Minister of MAAH, Dr Hanif, General President of Animal Husbandry, and Dr Raufi, General President of Veterinary Services. Supervision of fieldwork would not have been possible without the enthusiastic support of many staff from the MAAH, the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) of FAO, the University of Kabul, the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan and Oxfam UK. -
Enhancing Access to Education: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan
ENHANCING ACCESS TO EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN AFGHANISTAN BARNETT RUBIN and CLANCY RUDEFORTH N Y U CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL C I C COOPERATION May 2016 CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International cooperation is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges. The NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC) works to enhance international responses to conflict and insecurity through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community. CIC’s programs and research activities span the spectrum of conflict insecurity issues. This allows us to see critical inter-connections between politics, security, development and human rights and highlight the coherence often necessary for effective response. We have a particular concentration on the UN and multilateral responses to conflict. TABLE OF CONTENTS ENHANCING ACCESS TO EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN AFGHANISTAN PREFACE 4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 4 DISCLAIMER 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 OVERVIEW 6 TALIBAN POLICY AND PRACTICE TOWARD EDUCATION, PAST AND PRESENT 6 INTERVENTIONS TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO EDUCATION 7 EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 7 PART 1: INTRODUCTION 8 PART 2: PAST TALIBAN POLICY AND PRACTICE TOWARD EDUCATION 9 PART 3: CURRENT TALIBAN POLICY AND PRACTICE TOWARD EDUCATION 11 TALIBAN POLICY 11 TALIBAN PRACTICE – OVERVIEW 12 RESTRICTIONS ON GIRLS’ ACCESS 14 TACTICAL AND INCIDENTAL INTERFERENCE 15 PART 4: INTERVENTIONS 17 NON-STATE EDUCATION PROVISION 17 DIALOGUE AND MEDIATION 17 PART 5: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 20 PART 6: RECOMMENDATIONS 22 APPENDIX: AFGHANISTAN’S EDUCATION STATISTICS 24 ENDNOTES 25 Every school has its own story. -
Transitioned Faryab and the Taleban
Moving East in the North: Transitioned Faryab and the Taleban Author : Obaid Ali Published: 17 May 2013 Downloaded: 6 September 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/moving-east-in-the-north-transitioned-faryab-and-the-taleban/?format=pdf It took little more than seven months to turn Faryab from a province with a worrisome security situation into a province under constant attack. Since the Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab closed in September 2012, the security situation has quickly deteriorated. These days, Faryab is one of the main targets of the Taleban’s spring offensive. On the very first day of the offensive, the insurgents launched their biggest attack so far in the country, with several hundred fighters sweeping the Afghan Local Police (ALP) out of important positions in two districts. Clashes between national security forces and insurgents are continuing on a daily basis and the regular Afghan forces seem unable to make a lasting impact. AAN’s Obaid Ali updates an earlier report on a province perceived as a gateway to the north of the country and how the Taleban are targeting strategically valuable locations. Faryab has not seen a spring like this since the civil war in the 1990s. Four of its 14 districts are 1 / 5 currently under constant attack: Qaisar, Almar and Ghormach in the south-west and Pashton Kot in central Faryab, close to the provincial capital Maimana. In the announcement of their spring offensive on 28 April 2013, the Taleban stated that their main targets would be military bases and ‘diplomatic centers’. -
Integrated Groundwater Study in Jalaier Valley, Shirin Tagab District of Faryab Province, Afghanistan
Integrated Groundwater Study in Jalaier Valley, Shirin Tagab District of Faryab Province, Afghanistan By M. Hassan Saffi, Hydrogeologist June 2010 Paikob-e-Naswar, Wazirabad, PO Box 208, Kabul, Afghanistan Phone: (+93)(020) 220 17 50 Mobile (+93)(0)70 28 82 32 E-mail: dacaar@dacaar.org Website: www.dacaar.org 1 Table of Contents 1. Introduction. ................................................................................................................ 3 2. Objective ..................................................................................................................... 5 3. Physical setting ........................................................................................................... 5 3.1. Geomorphology ........................................................................................................ 5 3.2. Climate ..................................................................................................................... 6 3.3. Shirin Tagab river ..................................................................................................... 8 3.4. Geologic setting...................................................................................................... 12 3.5. Hydrogeologic setting ............................................................................................. 15 3.6. Water quality assessment ...................................................................................... 15 4. Integrated groundwater study approach in Jalaier valley ............................................ -
The Insurgents of the Afghan North. the Rise of the Taleban, the Self-Abandonment Of
Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter The Insurgents of the Afghan North The rise of the Taleban, the self-abandonment of the Afghan government and the effects of ISAF’s ‘capture-and-kill campaign’ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Until recently, the belief was widespread that Taleban attempts to build up local structures the Greater North was immune from Taleban was in fact a patient effort of systematic infiltration, due mainly to two reasons: infiltration, reflecting a strategy to extend their control beyond their traditional a) The Taleban were perceived as a purely strongholds in the south. The Taleban Pashtun movement by local Western repeated patterns of infiltration that had been analysts and the Afghan government. This utilised elsewhere in Afghanistan: They would limit their potential for recruitment initially allocated material resources and to predominantly Pashtun areas, of which manpower to the Greater North, sent political few exist in the Greater North of agents to recruit sympathetic mullahs and Afghanistan; appeal to disgruntled Pashtuns, and installed b) In practice, the level of Taleban infiltration sympathetic mullahs in local madrassas and from southern Afghanistan and activity of mosques – with visible results from 2008 other insurgent groups remained very low onwards. By early 2010, the Taleban had until 2008, compared to the south and brought the northern half of Baghlan, several east of Afghanistan. Attempts by the districts in the south and north of Kunduz, Taleban to gain support and build cells in most of northern Takhar and parts of Faryab the so-called Pashtun pockets from 2005 and Jowzjan under their military control or onwards did not translate into military influence. -
2 September 2010
SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Security Situation Report, Week 35, 27 August – 2 September 2010 JOINT WEEKLY SECURITY ANALYSIS A slight increase was recorded in the overall number of security incidents compared to the previous week with only the NR recording a slight decrease. The NER, SR and SER maintained relatively consistent incident levels, while the WR, ER and CR recorded increases with the WR recording a significant increase by about 70%. The SR, SER and ER remained the most volatile areas of the country. Kunduz accounted for the majority of incidents in the NER, where increased armed clashes were recorded. AGE activity intensified in northern Takhar along the Tajikistan border. In the NR, AGE activity spread to areas previously considered as insurgent-free in Balkh and Samangan. Faryab continued to account for the majority of the security incidents in the region. In the WR, AGE activity focused as usual on Badghis, but also spread in and around Hirat City. In the SR, Hilmand and Kandahar remained the main area of AGE focus, while incidents in Uruzgan Province keep increasing. A tactical shift from armed clashes to more IED incidents was noticed in the SR. The SER witnessed a high tempo of AGE activity across all provinces, reflected in a number of spectacular though unsuccessful attacks. In the ER, in the traditional focal provinces, Kunar recorded the majority of stand-off attacks and Nangarhar the bulk of IED incidents. The increase in the CR is attributed to increased AGE kinetic activity in Wardak Province and increased arrests and seizures in Kabul.